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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
This consolidated criminal appeal arises from the 
conviction, in August 2008, of two brothers, Barron Walker 
and Barry Walker, for various federal drug trafficking, 
firearm, and robbery charges.  The Walker brothers were each 
sentenced to prison terms of 47 ½ years.  They now appeal 
their convictions on several grounds.   
I.  Background 
 A. Indictment and Pre-Trial Motions 
On June 27, 2007, defendants Barron Walker and 
Barry Walker were each charged in a four-count indictment 
for possession of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1)) (Count I); criminal conspiracy, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846 (Count II); possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) (Count III); and possession of a firearm by a 
prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 
IV).  The indictment alleged that these crimes occurred in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, during the weeks before May 31, 
2007.   
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 In a series of superseding indictments, the government 
filed several additional charges against the Walkers.
1
  
Ultimately, both Walkers were charged with attempted 
robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 
(Count VI), and with using a firearm in furtherance of the 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count V), for 
their involvement in the attempted robbery of a crack cocaine 
dealer at gunpoint on May 31, 2007.  Barry Walker, who was 
ordered detained by the federal magistrate judge following 
the attempted robbery, was also charged with escaping from 
custody on July 10, 2007, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) 
(Count VII).  When Barry Walker was re-arrested two days 
later while sitting in a car, the arresting officers recovered 
crack cocaine from his person and the car‘s passenger 
admitted that Walker entered the vehicle to sell him crack 
cocaine.  As a result, Barry Walker was charged with an 
additional count of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count VIII). 
 On August 20, 2007, defendant Barron Walker filed a 
motion to sever for misjoinder based upon the escape charge 
and the additional drug charge against his brother Barry.  The 
motion argued that joinder was improper under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 8(b), and also argued, in the 
alternative, that even if joinder were proper, the district court 
should sever the trials pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 14 to prevent prejudice to Barron.  The district 
court denied the motion on May 30, 2008, finding that joinder 
was proper because ―the events of May 31, 2007, in which 
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 The final superseding indictment also contained three 
charges against Jason McNeil, who subsequently pled guilty 
and testified against the Walker brothers at their trial.   
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both Barron and Barry are alleged to have participated, are 
properly seen as a logical predicate to Barry‘s alleged escape, 
and the escape, in turn, the culminating act ‗in the same series 
of acts.‘‖  With respect to prejudice, the court held that the 
jury would be able to ―compartmentalize the evidence that 
Barry allegedly escaped custody, and give each defendant his 
due.‖  The court also promised to instruct the jury to give 
separate consideration to each charge against each defendant, 
and later gave such an instruction at trial.  Barron Walker 
renewed the motion to sever at trial, and the court denied it 
for the same reasons.   
 On August 6, 2008, five days before trial, the 
government disclosed to defense counsel its intention to 
prove the interstate commerce prong of the Hobbs Act 
robbery charge through the testimony of Chief John Goshert 
of the Dauphin County Criminal Investigation Division, a 
thirty-year veteran of cocaine trafficking investigations in 
Harrisburg and the region.  The Walkers objected to the 
testimony based on the timing of the government‘s notice of 
its intent to call Goshert as an expert.  The District Court 
rejected this argument on the ground that the Walkers had not 
requested expert notification pursuant to Rule 16 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Walkers also 
objected to Chief Goshert‘s testimony regarding the interstate 
transportation of cocaine on the ground that it is possible to 
manufacture cocaine synthetically.  The District Court 
rejected this argument and permitted Chief Goshert to testify 
as an expert that in his experience cocaine is manufactured 
outside of Pennsylvania. 
 
 B. Jury Trial 
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A joint jury trial for both Walker brothers was held 
from August 11 to August 14, 2008.
2
  To prove the charges 
that the Walkers were engaged in drug trafficking, 
conspiracy, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug 
trafficking during the weeks before May 31, 2007 (Counts I, 
II, and III), the government presented testimony from several 
witnesses, including (1) Jason McNeil, who pled guilty to 
participating in the Hobbs Act robbery with the Walkers; (2) 
Carmillia King, Barry Walker‘s girlfriend; and (3) Skylar 
Rhoades, a confidential informant. 
Only McNeil and Rhoades presented testimony 
supporting the charge of possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking in the weeks before May 31, 
2007 (Count III).  First, McNeil testified that the Walkers 
were crack cocaine dealers, and that he had ridden along with 
them as they drove through Harrisburg and made five to ten 
sales to crack cocaine customers.  He also testified that one of 
the Walkers possessed a firearm during these deliveries.  
While he believed that Barron Walker possessed the firearm, 
he admitted that he was not ―positive‖ which brother 
possessed it.   
Second, Skylar Rhoades, the confidential informant, 
testified that about two or three weeks before the May 31, 
2007 robbery, he was with Jason McNeil‘s brother, John 
McNeil, when John purchased crack cocaine from Barron and 
Barry Walker.  According to Rhoades, when the Walkers 
arrived at the meeting place and got out of their vehicle, he 
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 In the following paragraphs, we summarize only the 
evidence presented at trial relevant to the disposition of this 
appeal. 
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saw crack in the possession of Barron Walker.  He also saw 
Barry Walker deliver crack cocaine to John McNeil, and 
observed a pistol on Barry Walker‘s hip.  During cross-
examination, the defense extensively questioned Rhoades 
concerning his motives to cooperate with the government and 
the veracity of his testimony.  At the close of trial, the District 
Court gave a constructive possession instruction to the jury 
for the gun possession charge.   
To prove the Hobbs Act attempted robbery charge 
(Count VI) and the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime 
of violence charge (Count V), the government presented 
evidence
3
 that on May 31, 2007, the Walkers, along with 
three friends—Jason McNeil, John McNeil, and James 
Leeks—agreed to find street-level drug traffickers to rob of 
their drugs and money.  During the planning of the robbery, 
the Walkers supplied a firearm to Jason McNeil to be used 
during the robbery.  The robbers then assembled in an 
alleyway and watched Edward Wright, a crack cocaine 
dealer, make a sale to a customer.  John McNeil approached 
Wright with his gun drawn and attempted to rob him, but 
Wright took out his own firearm and fired.  John and his 
companions then opened fire on Wright.  John and Wright 
were both hit multiple times by gun shots; Wright survived, 
but John died at the scene.   
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 In support of these charges, the government presented 
testimony from the target of the robbery, Edward Wright; two 
participants in the robbery, James Leaks and Jason McNeil; 
investigating law enforcement officers; several background 
witnesses, and the confidential informant Skylar Rhoades.   
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To satisfy the Hobbs Act‘s requirement that the 
defendants‘ conduct ―obstruct[ed], delay[ed] or affect[ed] 
commerce,‖ see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), the government 
presented testimony from two witnesses.  The first witness 
was the robbery victim, Edward Wright.  Wright, who was 
17-years-old at the time of the robbery, testified at trial that 
he was only on the street for five minutes and had completed 
his very first drug sale.  He also testified that he obtained his 
crack cocaine for $60 from someone with the street name 
―Ice‖ whom he met outside a bar a day or two before, and that 
he made about $40 or $50 by selling the cocaine he obtained 
from Ice.  Wright also didn‘t know anything about Ice, 
including whether Ice lived in Harrisburg, and never saw him 
before or after the purchase.  In addition, Wright testified that 
the Walkers and their accomplices did not succeed in actually 
taking his crack cocaine, money, or gun from him.   
The second witness was Chief John Goshert, the 
government‘s expert on the interstate aspects of cocaine 
trafficking.  At trial, Goshert testified that, during his thirty 
years in the drug investigation field, he was involved with 
approximately 100 cocaine investigations a month, spoke 
with drug traffickers on a daily basis, and regularly 
participated in investigations involving the importation of 
cocaine into the Harrisburg area.  Goshert rendered the expert 
opinion that cocaine is manufactured outside of Pennsylvania 
and transported into the state.  Goshert identified New York 
City as the primary source for cocaine in the Harrisburg area.  
He also testified that in his thirty years of experience, he had 
never heard of synthetic cocaine being manufactured inside 
Pennsylvania.   
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict finding both defendants guilty of distributing crack 
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cocaine (Count I), conspiring to distribute crack cocaine 
(Count II), possessing a firearm in furtherance of the 
distribution of crack cocaine (Count III), Hobbs Act robbery 
(Count VI), and possessing of a firearm in furtherance of a 
Hobbs Act robbery (Count V).  The jury also found Barry 
Walker guilty on the two counts arising from his escape 
(Counts VII–VIII).4   
C.  Motion for a New Trial and Sentencing 
A few weeks after trial, Assistant United States 
Attorney Michael Consiglio, who had tried the case, wrote to 
defense counsel to notify them of the following:  On March 8, 
2007, while Rhoades was working with the ATF as a 
confidential informant on an unrelated case, agents met with 
Rhoades for the purpose of arranging a purchase of crack 
cocaine from a target in quantities of an ounce (28 grams) or 
larger.  When Rhoades arrived, the officers asked Rhoades to 
change coats because the coat he was wearing would interfere 
with audio recording they planned to conduct.  One of the 
agents retrieved a coat from the back of Rhoades‘ car and 
searched the pockets.  One of the pockets contained flakes of 
marijuana and two loose rocks of cocaine base weighing 0.18 
grams.  Rhoades told the officers that the jacket was his, but 
that the substances were old and that he did not know that 
they were in the jacket.   
Rhoades was not charged with any crimes for this 
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 The prosecutor voluntarily dismissed Count IV, which 
charged the Walkers with possession of a firearm after being 
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year 
imprisonment. 
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incident, and the agents properly notified Consiglio at the 
time, but Consiglio failed to remember the incident until after 
the trial of this case.  Upon being notified of this incident by 
Consiglio, the defendants promptly filed a motion for a new 
trial alleging that impeaching Brady material relating to an 
important government witness was improperly withheld.  The 
District Court denied the motion for a new trial on the ground 
that the defendants already effectively cross-examined 
Rhoades at trial, making it unlikely that the jury would reach 
a different result if the material had been handed over. 
Thereafter, the District Court sentenced Barron Walker 
to a term of 47 ½ years, consisting of 210 months on Counts 
I, II, and VI to be served concurrently, a 60 month mandatory 
minimum consecutive term on Count III (the first gun charge) 
and a 300 month mandatory minimum consecutive term on 
Count V (the second gun charge).  The District Court also 
sentenced Barry Walker to a term of 47 ½ years, consisting of 
210 months on Counts I, II, VI, VII, and VIII to be served 
concurrently, and 60 month and 300 month consecutive terms 
for Counts III and V.    
The Walkers now appeal on five principal grounds.
5
  
First, Barron Walker argues that the District Court should 
have granted his motion to sever because of the two 
additional escape and drug charges against his brother Barry.  
Second, both Walkers argue that there was insufficient 
evidence to support their convictions for use of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug distribution in the weeks before May 31, 
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  The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal case 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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2007 (Count III).  Third, the defendants argue that the District 
Court erred by permitting the government‘s drug trafficking 
expert, Chief Goshert, to testify.  Fourth, the defendants argue 
that there was insufficient evidence of an effect upon 
interstate commerce to support their convictions under the 
Hobbs Act (Count VI).  Fifth, the defendants argue that the 
District Court should have granted their motion for a new trial 
in light of the fact that the prosecution withheld impeaching 
Brady material concerning the confidential informant Skylar 
Rhoades. 
II.  Severance 
As noted above, while six of the eight charges in the 
final superseding indictment were made against both Walker 
brothers, the indictment charged Barry Walker alone with 
escaping from custody on July 10, 2007 (Count VII), and 
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base on the 
date of his re-arrest (Count VIII).  In this appeal, Barron 
Walker argues that the District Court erred in denying his 
motions to sever pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 8(b) and 14, which were based upon these charges 
against his brother.   
A.  Rule 8(b) 
Rule 8(b) governs the joinder of defendants in federal 
criminal cases.
6
  ―The appeal of a denial of a Rule 8 motion 
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 In full, Rule 8(b) states that:  
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[for improper joinder] is a claim of legal error, which we 
review de novo.‖  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 82 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 
567 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The ―inquiry into whether . . . 
defendants were properly joined focuses upon the indictment, 
not upon the proof that was subsequently produced at trial.‖  
United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citation omitted).  In construing this rule, this court has 
followed the Supreme Court in recognizing the ―fundamental 
principle that the federal system prefers ‗joint trials of 
defendants who are indicted together [ ]‘ because joint trials 
‗promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by 
avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.‘‖  
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005) 
                                                                                                     
The indictment or information may charge 2 or 
more defendants if they are alleged to have 
participated in the same act or transaction, or in 
the same series of acts or transactions, 
constituting an offense or offenses. The 
defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately. All defendants 
need not be charged in each count. 
Rule 8(a) provides: 
The indictment or information may charge a 
defendant in separate counts with 2 or more 
offenses if the offenses charged—whether 
felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of the 
same or similar character, or are based on the 
same act or transaction, or are connected with 
or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 
13 
 
(quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) 
(alteration in original)). 
Rule 8(b) is ―less permissive‖ than Rule (8)(a), which 
governs the joinder of counts against a single defendant.  
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 570.  We note, as a threshold matter, 
that much as in Irizarry, Walker‘s ―focus on Rule 8(b) at first 
appears misguided because Rule 8(b) authorizes joinder of 
defendants and [Walker] is actually challenging the joinder of 
allegedly unrelated offenses.‖  341 F.3d at 287.  However, we 
have held that Rule 8(a) ―‗applies only to prosecutions 
involving a single defendant‖ and that in a multi-defendant 
case such as this, ‗the tests for joinder of counts and 
defendants is merged in Rule 8(b).‘‖  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 729 n.8 (3d Cir. 1974)).  
Accordingly, we analyze Walker‘s misjoinder challenge 
under Rule 8(b).   
Under Rule 8(b), ―[i]t is not enough that defendants 
are involved in offenses of the same or similar character; 
there must exist a transactional nexus in that the defendants 
must have participated in ‗the same act or transaction, or in 
the same series of acts or transactions,‘ before joinder of 
defendants in a multiple-defendant trial is proper.‖  Jimenez, 
513 F.3d at 82-83 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b); citing 
Irizarry, 341 F.3d at 287 n.4).  Where charges leveled against 
only a single defendant ―arose directly‖ from her participation 
in a common illicit enterprise which led to charges against 
that defendant and co-defendants, we have held that all of the 
charges may be considered part of the same series of acts, 
rendering joinder proper under Rule 8(b).  United States v. 
Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 334 (3d Cir. 2010) (―In this case, it was 
Riley‘s failure to report income earned from the land fraud 
scheme that led to her Tax Fraud Counts.  Because the tax 
14 
 
evasion arose directly from the land fraud proceeds, it was in 
the interest of judicial efficiency to join these claims.‖).   
Barron Walker argues that joinder was improper 
because the first four counts of the indictment, including the 
conspiracy count, only covered conduct occurring before May 
31, 2007, while the escape and additional drug charges 
against Barry Walker were both based on conduct occurring 
in July 2007.  While a conspiracy count may serve as a link 
justifying the joinder of various substantive offenses, see 
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 567, joinder may still be proper in the 
absence of a conspiracy count covering the time period for 
every substantive offense if those substantive offenses were 
part of the same series of transactions.  In this case, the two 
escape-related charges against Barry Walker were properly 
joined because they arose directly from the earlier drug, 
conspiracy, and gun charges.  In so holding, we agree with 
the analysis of Rule 8(b) by the district court in United States 
v. Avila: 
[T]he government may charge escape-related 
crimes alongside underlying offenses if the two 
are closely related to one another.  This nexus 
depends upon the temporal proximity between 
the offenses, whether the defendant escaped to 
evade prosecution for the underlying offense, 
and whether the defendant was in custody for 
the underlying offense at the time of the flight.  
610 F. Supp. 2d 391, 395 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted).   
Barry Walker‘s evident purpose in escaping from 
pretrial detention was to evade prosecution for the offenses 
charged in the first four counts of the indictment.  If it were 
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not for the underlying offenses, Walker would not have been 
arrested and then able to escape from custody.  Similarly, the 
additional drug charge arose directly from the initial charges, 
because at the time of Walker‘s re-arrest and the discovery of 
cocaine on his person the police were searching for him in an 
effort to return him to custody so that he could be tried for the 
four charges then pending against him.  We note, in addition, 
that the short span of time between the initial offenses and the 
two charges against Barry Walker—a period of a little over a 
month—further suggests that the various charges were part of 
the same series of transactions.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the defendants were properly joined pursuant to Rule 
8(b).   
B.  Rule 14 
We review whether a motion for severance to prevent 
prejudice should have been granted pursuant to Rule 14 under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 334; 
United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005).  
While Rule 8 requires severance where defendants were 
improperly joined, Rule 14 permits a district court ―to sever 
properly joined defendants and order a separate trial where a 
consolidated trial appears to prejudice the defendant.‖  Id. at 
82 n.7; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a) (―If the joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a 
consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the 
government, the court may order separate trials of counts, 
sever the defendants‘ trials, or provide any other relief that 
justice requires.‖).  The district court may order severance to 
prevent the ―serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the 
jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 
innocence.‖ United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 287 (3d 
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Cir. 2008). 
To prevail on a Rule 14 motion, a defendant must 
―‗pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an 
unfair trial.‘‖  Riley, 621 F.3d at 335 (quoting United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992)).  As a result, ―a 
defendant is not entitled to a severance merely because 
evidence against a co-defendant is more damaging than the 
evidence against the moving party.‖ United States v. Lore, 
430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Instead, the question of prejudice hinges upon 
―whether the jury will be able to compartmentalize the 
evidence as it relates to separate defendants in view of its 
volume and limited admissibility.‖  Davis, 397 F.3d at 182.  
Where additional charges against a single defendant are 
―relatively straightforward and discrete,‖ we have ―not 
doubt[ed] that the jury reasonably could have been expected 
to compartmentalize the evidence . . . and actually did so.‖  
Lore, 430 F.3d at 205.  By contrast, ―[w]hen many defendants 
are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly 
different degrees of culpability, the risk of prejudice is 
heightened.‖  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.   
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to grant Barron Walker‘s Rule 14 
motion to sever.  We reach this conclusion for two primary 
reasons.  First, although the defendants were brothers, they 
were the only two defendants in a trial that lasted a total of 
four days and that featured charges arising from only three 
distinct episodes of criminal conduct.  See Davis, 397 F.3d at 
182 (―In this case, the facts are relatively simple; all the 
events occurred in a single evening; there are only three 
defendants; and there are no overly technical or scientific 
issues. Therefore, we conclude that the jury could reasonably 
17 
 
have been expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it 
related to each individual defendant.‖).  With respect to the 
escape-related counts, the evidence presented at trial 
concerning Barry‘s escape and subsequent arrest was 
relatively uncomplicated, suggesting that the jury would have 
little trouble keeping it separate from the evidence against 
Barron.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the jury would have been able to 
compartmentalize the evidence presented against Barry 
Walker with respect to the escape and the additional drug 
charge.
7
  See id. (holding that jurors could compartmentalize 
the conduct of a co-defendant who fled from scene of crime 
from evidence regarding defendant who did not flee). 
 Second, the district judge instructed the jury that 
―[e]ach offense and each defendant must be considered 
separately.‖  The judge also told the jury that its ―decision on 
any one defendant or any one offense, whether guilty or not 
guilty, should not influence your decision on any other 
defendant or any other offense.‖  We presume that the jury 
followed those instructions, ―and thus we regard the 
instructions as persuasive evidence that refusals to sever did 
not prejudice the defendants.‖  Lore, 430 F.3d at 206 (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
III. Use of a Firearm in Furtherance of Drug 
Distribution  
                                              
7
 Moreover, even if the evidence against Barry Walker was 
marginally stronger on certain joint counts, the defendants did 
not have the kind of ―markedly different degrees of 
culpability‖ that would suggest a heightened risk of prejudice.  
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.   
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The Walkers both argue that insufficient evidence 
supported their convictions under Count III for the possession 
of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking during the 
weeks before May 31, 2007, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c).   
In reviewing a motion for a judgment of acquittal due 
to insufficient evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29, we apply a ―particularly deferential standard . . 
. because a reviewing court ‗must be ever vigilant . . . not to 
usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and 
assigning weight to the evidence.‘‖  United States v. 
Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
Accordingly, we must ―view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and sustain the verdict unless it is 
clear that no rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  
Id. (citing United States v. Cunningham, 517 F.3d 175, 177 
(3d Cir. 2008)).  We examine ―the totality of the evidence, 
both direct and circumstantial,‖ United States v. Sparrow, 371 
F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and only ―when the record contains no evidence, 
regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt‖ will we reverse a jury 
verdict for insufficiency of the evidence.  United States v. 
Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), it is a crime if an individual 
uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime, or possesses a firearm in furtherance of 
19 
 
such a crime.
8
  To obtain a conviction under § 924(c), ―the 
‗mere presence‘ of a gun is not enough.‖  Sparrow, 371 F.3d 
at 853.  Rather, the government must present evidence 
―specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her 
possession actually furthered the drug trafficking offense.‖  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other words, ―the 
government must show that the defendant possessed the 
firearm ‗to advance or promote criminal activity.‘‖  United 
States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 2006)).  In 
determining whether a firearm was possessed in furtherance 
of drug trafficking, we have looked to the following 
nonexclusive factors:   
the type of drug activity that is being conducted, 
accessibility of the firearm, the type of the 
weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the 
status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), 
whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or 
drug profits, and the time and circumstances 
                                              
8
 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (―[A]ny person who, during 
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 
that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the 
use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the 
person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses 
or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 
possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 
be sentenced to [various punishments described].‖). 
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under which the gun is found. 
Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United 
States v. Ceballos–Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 
2000)); see also Bobb, 471 F.3d at 496-97 (applying Sparrow 
factors).   
 We have also recognized that § 924(c) may be violated 
through the constructive possession of a firearm.  See 
Cunningham, 517 F.3d at 178.  We have defined constructive 
possession as follows: 
―Constructive possession exists if an individual 
knowingly has both the power and the intention 
at a given time to exercise dominion or control 
over a thing, either directly or through another 
person or persons. Constructive possession 
necessarily requires both dominion and control 
over an object and knowledge of that object‘s 
existence.‖ 
Id. (quoting United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 
1992)).  Constructive possession may be proved by either 
direct or circumstantial evidence, and it need not be exclusive 
to a single person.  Iglesias, 535 F.3d at 156.   
 We hold that the evidence presented at trial, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to 
sustain both Walkers‘ § 924(c) convictions.  The strongest 
evidence supporting these charges was the testimony of 
Skylar Rhoades, the confidential informant, who stated that 
he observed Barry Walker in actual possession of a gun 
during a drug sale in which the Walker brothers participated:   
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I was with Jason McNeil. . . . We drove up.  I 
looked into the [Walkers‘] Expedition.  I see 
Barron and Barry Walker both inside the 
Expedition.  Barry gets out.  I could see the gun 
on his waistband, and I could see Barron with 
crack cocaine on his lap.  They g[a]ve . . . John 
McNeil about a quarter to an eightball of crack 
cocaine, and then that‘s when I took down the 
license plate to the Expedition to [transmit] it 
back to [law enforcement.] 
Based on this direct eyewitness testimony, a rational juror 
could readily conclude that Barry Walker actually possessed a 
firearm at the time of the cocaine sale.
 9
  Further, a rational 
juror could infer that Barry Walker possessed the firearm in 
order to ―advance or promote‖ the illegal sale.  Iglesias, 535 
F.3d at 157.  Several of the Sparrow factors favor such an 
inference:  Barry Walker, together with his brother, engaged 
in the sale of crack cocaine, an illegal and dangerous drug; 
the firearm—located on Barry‘s hip—was readily available in 
the event he needed it for protection during the sale; the 
firearm was in close proximity to the cocaine that was handed 
                                              
9
 Barry Walker mistakenly seeks support from the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
143 (1995), which held that mere possession of a firearm is 
not sufficient to support a conviction under § 924(c).  As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, Congress amended § 924 in 
1998 to add the word ―possess‖ to the statute, thus 
overturning Bailey.  See United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 
2169, 2179 (2010). 
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to John McNeil; and the firearm was in Barry Walker‘s 
possession throughout the course of the transaction.  See 
Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853.   
While there is no evidence in the record concerning 
certain factors—it is uncertain, for example, whether Barry 
Walker‘s gun was stolen and whether it was loaded during the 
sale—our prior decisions have not required that every single 
factor must weigh in favor of conviction.  See Sparrow, 371 
F.3d at 853-54 (upholding conviction where ―many of the . . . 
factors are satisfied‖ and holding that ―immediate 
accessibility at the time of search or arrest is not a legal 
requirement for a § 924(c) conviction‖); Bobb, 471 F.3d at 
496 (upholding conviction where the evidence was ―sufficient 
to find a nexus between the possession of the gun and the 
drug trafficking, and to satisfy many of the [Sparrow] 
factors‖).  Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution 
presented enough evidence that a rational jury could conclude 
that Barry Walker not only actually possessed a firearm, but 
did so in furtherance of drug trafficking. 
The evidence against Barron Walker on the § 924(c) 
charge was also sufficient to sustain his conviction.  Barron‘s 
conviction was supported by the testimony of both Jason 
McNeil and Skylar Rhoades.
10
  While being questioned by 
the prosecution, McNeil testified that he accompanied the 
Walkers as they drove through Harrisburg and made five to 
                                              
10
 The defendants claim that the ―entire case‖ for the 
prosecution consisted of the testimony of confidential 
informant Skylar Rhoades.  This is incorrect: as noted in the 
remainder of the paragraph above, the testimony of Jason 
McNeil also supported the jury‘s verdict on this count.   
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ten deliveries of crack cocaine to customers.  McNeil then 
explained that he saw the Walkers with firearms during these 
deliveries.  When asked who had a firearm, he said ―I think it 
was Barron.‖  When questioned further on cross-examination, 
he admitted that he was not ―positive‖ that Barron actually 
possessed the firearm. 
Standing alone, this testimony might be insufficient to 
sustain Barron‘s conviction, because the witness himself had 
some doubt about whether Barron had the firearm on his 
person.  However, this evidence does not stand alone:  Skylar 
Rhoades testified that he saw Barron and Barry arrive 
together in the same vehicle, that Barron had cocaine in his 
possession, and that Barron and Barry jointly made a cocaine 
sale while Barry wore a gun on his hip.   
A rational juror, considering the testimony of Rhoades 
and McNeil together, could conclude that Barron at the very 
least had constructive possession of a firearm during the 
brothers‘ drug sales.  During the cocaine sale witnessed by 
Rhoades, the gun on Barry‘s hip was readily visible to 
Rhoades, supporting the inference that it was also visible to 
Barron, who was a joint participant in the sale.  Accordingly, 
the jury could rationally have concluded that Barron knew 
that Barry possessed the firearm, rendering this case 
distinguishable from our § 924(c) decisions involving guns in 
closed containers.  See Cunningham, 517 F.3d at 179 (holding 
that defendant did not constructively possess gun in his 
companion‘s backpack where the ―evidence did not 
demonstrate that [the defendant] knew about the gun‖ 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Garth, 
188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that defendant who 
was unaware that his co-defendants possessed a firearm in a 
black bag did not constructively possess it).  The jury could 
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likewise have reasonably concluded that Barron had the 
intention to exercise dominion over the firearm through 
Barry, because the firearm provided protection to both of 
them during their sales.  See Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 96 
(constructive possession exists ―if an individual knowingly 
has both the power and the intention at a given time to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or 
through another person or persons‖ (emphasis added)).  
Moreover, as we noted in Iafelice, ―[c]ommon sense counsels 
that an owner and operator of a vehicle usually has dominion 
and control over the objects in his or her vehicle of which he 
or she is aware.‖  Id. at 97.  In this case, Barry was observed 
with the gun as he exited the Walkers‘ vehicle, strengthening 
the conclusion that Barron was both aware of the gun and 
exercised a level of indirect control sufficient to support the 
verdict.
11
 
For similar reasons, there was sufficient evidence for 
the jury to conclude that Barron‘s constructive possession of a 
firearm was in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  
During the sale witnessed by Rhoades, Barron had cocaine in 
                                              
11 Barron‘s attempt to rely upon United States v. Jenkins, 90 
F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 1996), is unpersuasive.  In Jenkins, police 
discovered the defendant in an acquaintance‘s apartment 
sitting in front of a coffee table that contained guns, bags of 
cocaine, scales, and other drug paraphernalia.  This court 
found that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant 
had constructive possession of these items where no drug 
residue was found on him and his fingerprints were not found 
on the drugs.  Id. at 818.  In this case, by contrast, two 
eyewitnesses testified that Barron jointly participated in 
cocaine sales with Barry. 
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his lap, and then jointly participated in a sale of cocaine with 
Barry while Barry was carrying a gun.  The firearm on 
Barry‘s hip was easily accessible in case both Walkers needed 
it for protection.  Barron and Barry arrived in the same 
vehicle, putting Barron in close proximity to the firearm both 
before and during the sale.  Because Rhoades was able to see 
the gun on Barry‘s hip, the jury could infer that the gun was 
also visible to Barron.  Together, this evidence was enough to 
show that Barron‘s constructive possession of the gun 
advanced his illegal drug activity.  See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 
853 (noting relevance of ―the type of drug activity that is 
being conducted,‖ the ―accessibility of the firearm,‖ and the 
―proximity to drugs or drug profits‖).   
Accordingly, while the prosecution‘s case on these 
charges was not overwhelming, we conclude that the 
evidence presented on the § 924(c) charges was sufficient to 
sustain the defendants‘ convictions.   
IV.  Hobbs Act Expert Testimony 
At trial, the government‘s expert on cocaine 
trafficking, Chief Goshert, rendered the opinion that cocaine 
is manufactured outside of Pennsylvania and transported into 
the state.  In this appeal, the Walkers argue that the District 
Court erred in allowing Goshert to testify in support of the 
Hobbs Act charge.   
First, the Walkers argue that the prosecution failed to 
give them timely notice of the expert testimony.  The 
government first notified the defense of its intent to call 
Goshert on August 6, 2008, five days before trial, and 
volunteered to provide a summary of his testimony to the 
defense.  Defense counsel objected to the testimony, claiming 
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that the government should have given them more notice that 
Goshert would be called as an expert.  The District Court 
rightly rejected this argument on the ground that the 
defendants had not requested expert notification pursuant to 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) (―At the defendant’s request, the 
government must give to the defendant a written summary of 
any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 
702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its 
case-in-chief at trial.‖ (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 178 (―[T]he government must disclose, 
upon a defendant’s request, ‗a written summary of any 
testimony that the government intends to use.‘‖ (emphasis 
added) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)).
12
   
Second, the Walkers argue that Chief Goshert should 
not have been allowed to testify that cocaine is manufactured 
outside of Pennsylvania and transported into the state.  
Specifically, the Walkers argue that Goshert‘s testimony was 
unreliable because Wright could have possessed synthetic 
cocaine manufactured in Pennsylvania.  The Walkers point 
out that recipes for synthetic cocaine are readily available on 
the internet, and they also cite a series of court decisions from 
                                              
12
 Barry Walker also argues that he filed a pro se motion to 
compel discovery on May 27, 2008, in which he requested 
information regarding expert testimony.  However, as Barry 
Walker acknowledges, that pro se motion was stricken by the 
District Court on June 3, 2008, and forwarded to counsel of 
record.  Id.  Thus, the request was not properly made to the 
government. 
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the 1970s and 1980s which recognized that cocaine could be 
manufactured domestically.  The Walkers also note that 
Goshert admitted during his testimony that he is unable to 
distinguish synthetic cocaine from cocaine made from cocoa 
plants.   
We review a district court‘s decision to admit expert 
testimony for abuse of discretion and exercise plenary review 
over a district court‘s legal interpretation of Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  United States v. Mitchell, 365 
F.3d 215, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).  ―An expert witness may be 
permitted to testify regarding ‗scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge‘ if it ‗will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.‘‖  
United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 380 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).  Under Rule 702, a witness may 
qualify as an expert if three requirements are satisfied: ―(1) 
the testimony must be ‗based upon sufficient facts or data‘; 
(2) the testimony must be ‗the product of reliable principles 
and methods‘; and (3) the witness must have ‗applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).  In cases not involving scientific 
testimony, courts must still serve the gatekeeping function 
described in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993), but ―‗the factors identified in Daubert may or 
may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the 
nature of the issue, the expert‘s particular expertise, and the 
subject of his testimony.‘‖  Betterbox Commc’ns Ltd. v. BB 
Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)).  
In such cases ―‗the relevant reliability concerns may focus 
upon personal knowledge or experience.‘‖  Id. (quoting 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150).   
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The Walkers argue that Goshert, who acknowledged at 
trial that he is not a chemist and is unable to distinguish 
ordinary cocaine from synthetic cocaine, did not have the 
requisite expertise to testify about the geographic origins of 
the cocaine in Pennsylvania.  We disagree.  Goshert‘s 
testimony was based upon his thirty years of experience 
working as a narcotics investigator in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  Goshert testified that during that time period 
he regularly participated in investigations involving the 
importation of cocaine into the Harrisburg area, that he spoke 
with drug traffickers on a daily basis, and that he had worked 
with a variety of other law enforcements agencies, including 
the Drug Enforcement Administration and New York Police 
Department.  He also testified that he had taught courses and 
seminars on drug trafficking and drug identification to new 
and experienced police officers, to the Pennsylvania District 
Attorney‘s Association, and to community groups.  Upon 
being qualified as an expert, Goshert identified New York 
City as the primary source for cocaine in the Harrisburg area, 
and testified that in his thirty years of investigating cocaine 
cases he had never had a single law enforcement agent, 
informant, drug trafficker, or other individual indicate that 
cocaine was manufactured inside Pennsylvania.   
We agree with the District Court that Goshert‘s 
method for reaching these conclusions was reliable.  Our 
court has previously recognized that law enforcement 
officials can rely upon their specialized knowledge or 
experience to offer expert testimony on various aspects of 
drug trafficking.  See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 
318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002) (expert opinion on how drug 
traffickers use cellular telephones and pagers); United States 
v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999) (expert testimony 
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on coded drug language).  We have also recognized that law 
enforcement officers may, given the proper experience, testify 
in a Hobbs Act case regarding whether goods had originally 
been produced in another state.  See United States v. 
Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
police officer who was a resident of the Virgin Islands had 
sufficient knowledge to testify that beer sold by bar originated 
in the mainland United States).   
Goshert‘s expert opinions were based upon his 
personal experiences interacting with drug traffickers and law 
enforcement personnel over a period of decades.  During that 
time, he had numerous opportunities to investigate the 
geographic origins of the cocaine sold in Harrisburg.  
Accordingly, he did not need to be a professional chemist in 
order to gather reliable information on whether cocaine was 
being produced inside Pennsylvania or instead being 
produced elsewhere and transported into Pennsylvania.  See 
Betterbox, 300 F.3d at 328–29 (noting that specialized 
knowledge can be based upon ―practical experience as well as 
academic training and credentials‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
We also hold that Goshert‘s expert testimony was not 
rendered unreliable by the evidence the defense presented 
regarding the possibility of manufacturing cocaine 
synthetically.  Although it may be possible to find recipes for 
synthetic cocaine on the internet, the defense presented no 
evidence that synthetic cocaine has, at any time in the recent 
past, actually been manufactured in Pennsylvania.  Further, 
although the Walkers cite to a series of court decisions from 
the 1970s and 1980s which recognized that cocaine can be 
manufactured domestically, none of these cases involved 
conduct occurring in Pennsylvania, or conduct that occurred 
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in the last twenty years.  See Turner v. United States, 396 
U.S. 398 (1970);
13
 United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lamoureux, 711 F.2d 745 
(6th Cir. 1983).  Indeed, more recent cases have suggested 
that it is common knowledge that cocaine is imported into the 
United States from Latin America.  See United States v. 
Gomez, 580 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (―The importation 
and interstate transportation of cocaine, as well as the 
financial size of the cocaine trade, have been routinely and 
copiously discussed by public officials, candidates for office, 
and the news media for decades.‖).14   
                                              
13
 In Turner, the Supreme Court struck down a statute which 
provided that a person found to possess cocaine shall be 
presumed to have imported it.  See 396 U.S. at 418.  The 
Court, surveying the evidence as it existed in 1970, found that 
―much more cocaine is lawfully produced in this country than 
is smuggled into this country.‖  Id.  No similar statutory 
presumption of importation exists under the Hobbs Act, and 
the government did not attempt to suggest that the jury should 
entertain such a presumption.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court‘s factual finding that, in 1970, more cocaine was 
produced domestically than imported does not bar later courts 
from recognizing that patterns of production and distribution 
have changed.  Thus, in this case, the government presented 
expert testimony establishing that cocaine is currently 
imported from out of state and is not manufactured in 
Pennsylvania.     
14
 The parties assume, as do we for purposes of this appeal, 
that the place of origin of cocaine is sufficiently technical in 
nature to be the subject of expert testimony under Rule 702.  
But see United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 680 (2d Cir. 
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Accordingly, we agree with the government that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Chief Goshert‘s testimony regarding the interstate 
transportation of cocaine was reliable.   
V.  Hobbs Act Interstate Commerce Element 
The Walkers challenge whether the government‘s 
evidence was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce 
element of their Hobbs Act convictions.  They note that the 
target of their attempted robbery, Edward Wright, had just 
completed his first-ever drug sale at the time of the robbery, 
had purchased the illegal drugs locally for about $60, and had 
made about $40 to $50 from his single sale.  They also argue 
that the government presented insufficient evidence that 
Wright‘s cocaine was manufactured outside of Pennsylvania.   
We begin with first principles.  The Constitution 
delegates to Congress the power ―[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.‖  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Congress‘ 
power to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, although 
―greatly expanded‖ by the Court‘s New Deal-era commerce 
power decisions, is nonetheless ―subject to outer limits.‖  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (citing 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).  In Lopez, the Court identified 
the three areas within which Congress is authorized to 
                                                                                                     
2010) (holding that ―a jury is capable of concluding, based on 
its lay knowledge, that cocaine is imported into the United 
States‖ (citing Gomez, 580 F.3d at 102)). 
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regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause: (1) ―the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce;‖ (2) ―the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities;‖ and (3) ―those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce.‖  Id. at 558–59.   
Focusing on the third category, the Lopez Court struck 
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, holding that 
―possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.‖  Id. at 
567.  To reach any other conclusion, the Count held, would 
require it to ―pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States.‖  Id. 
The Court‘s decision in Lopez was followed by United 
States v. Morrison, which struck down the civil remedy 
provision in the Violence Against Women Act using 
reasoning that closely echoed that in Lopez.  See 529 U.S. 
598, 617 (2000) (holding that Congress may not ―regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct‘s aggregate effect on interstate commerce‖).  
Morrison, in turn, was followed by Gonzales v. Raich, which 
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of 
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizing the 
manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana to 
intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes.  545 U.S. 1 (2005).  In so holding, the Court 
emphasized that Congress possesses ―power to regulate 
purely local activities that are part of an economic ‗class of 
activities‘ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
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commerce.‖  Id. at 17.  Congress is not required:   
to legislate with scientific exactitude. When 
Congress decides that the total incidence of a 
practice poses a threat to a national market, it 
may regulate the entire class. In this vein . . . 
when a general regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis 
character of individual instances arising under 
that statute is of no consequence. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
We have recognized that this trio of commerce power 
decisions establishes a four-part analytical framework ―‗to 
determine whether a law regulates intrastate activity that has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.‘‖  United States v. 
Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Under this 
framework, ―a court should consider: (1) ‗the economic 
nature of the regulated activity;‘ (2) ‗a jurisdictional element 
limiting the reach of the law to a discrete set of activities that 
additionally has an explicit connection with or effect on 
interstate commerce;‘ (3) ‗express congressional findings 
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of the activity 
in question;‘ and (4) ‗the link between the regulated activity 
and interstate commerce.‘‖  Id. at 535–36 (quoting Gregg, 
226 F.3d at 262); see also United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 
150, 155–56 (3d Cir. 2001).   
To obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, the 
government must show that (1) the defendant committed 
―robbery or extortion‖ or attempted or conspired to do so, and 
(2) that conduct ―obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or affect[ed] 
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commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in 
commerce.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  The Hobbs Act defines the 
term ―commerce‖ broadly to include ―all . . . commerce over 
which the United States has jurisdiction.‖  18 U.S.C. § 
1951(b)(3); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 
215 (1960) (―[The Hobbs Act] speaks in broad language, 
manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power 
Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce 
by extortion, robbery or physical violence.‖).  Accordingly, 
the reach of the Hobbs Act is ―coextensive with that of the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.‖  United 
States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 230 n.8 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Villafranca, 260 F.3d 374, 377 (noting that 
―the Hobbs Act‘s required effect on interstate commerce is 
identical with the requirements of federal jurisdiction under 
the Commerce Clause‖ (citation omitted)).   
The Hobbs Act differs from the statutes struck down in 
Lopez and Morrison in two crucial respects.  First, the Hobbs 
Act contains a ―jurisdictional element‖ which limits its scope.  
That is, the Hobbs Act ―only applies to crimes which 
‗obstruct[ ], delay[ ], or affect[ ] commerce or the movement 
of any article or commodity in commerce.‘‖  United States v. 
Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a)).  Second, the Hobbs Act regulates quintessentially 
―economic‖ activities.  Although drawing the line between 
―economic‖ and ―non-economic‖ activities may sometimes be 
difficult, property crimes like robbery and extortion are—
unlike the possession of a gun in a school zone or gender-
motivated violence—indisputably  ―economic‖ under our 
post-Lopez precedents.  See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 
569, 581 (3d Cir. 1995) (―[C]arjacking is economic . . . . 
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When a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his or her 
car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim 
has suffered an undeniable and substantial loss.‖); Spinello, 
265 F.3d at 156 (describing bank robbery as an ―‗economic‘ 
activity almost by definition‖); United States v. Whited, 311 
F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (―[T]heft in connection with 
health care . . . is economic in nature.  The theft itself is 
motivated exclusively by an immediate pecuniary gain, and 
effects an explicit economic transfer.‖ (citations omitted)).   
Because of the fundamentally economic character of 
robbery and extortion, we have held, in the wake of Lopez 
and its progeny, that in Lopez category-three cases
15
 the 
government is not required to present ―proof of a ‗substantial 
effect‘ on commerce in an individual case in order to show a 
Hobbs Act violation.‖  Urban, 404 F.3d at 766 (citing 
Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711); accord Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 
(holding that Congress possesses the ―power to regulate 
                                              
15
 As noted above, category three encompasses ―those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.‖  514 U.S. at 558-59.  Because the parties have 
not suggested that this case falls under the second Lopez 
category, which permits Congress to regulate ―the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things 
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities,‖ id. at 558, we do not address 
its applicability to this case.  As discussed below, however, 
we do find the fact that the cocaine the Walkers targeted 
originated outside Pennsylvania relevant to the category-three 
inquiry of whether there was a sufficiently close ―link 
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.‖  
Kukafka, 478 F.3d at 536.   
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purely local activities that are part of an economic ‗class of 
activities‘ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce‖).  As we noted in Clausen, ―‗the cumulative result 
of many Hobbs Act violations is a substantial effect upon 
interstate commerce,‘ and that substantial effect empowers 
Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.‖  328 
F.3d at 711 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 
1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Urban, 404 F.3d at 765 
(noting that ―‗legislation concerning an intrastate activity will 
be upheld if Congress could rationally have concluded that 
the activity, in isolation or in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce‘‖ (quoting Robinson, 119 F.3d at 
1211)).   
Accordingly, we have held that in a Hobbs Act 
prosecution, ―‗proof of a de minimis effect on interstate 
commerce is all that is required.‘‖  Urban, 404 F.3d at 766 
(quoting Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711).  We have also upheld 
jury instructions which state that the ―‗de minimis effect‘ in 
an individual Hobbs Act case need only be ‗potential.‘‖  Id. at 
766 (quoting Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209–10); see also 
Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10 (―‗[I]f the defendants‘ conduct 
produces any interference with or effect upon interstate 
commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential, it is 
sufficient to uphold a prosecution under [§ 1951].‘‖ (quoting 
Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1285 (2d Cir. 
1991))).   
The Walkers make several arguments in support of 
their insufficiency claim.  First, they emphasize that the 
robbery victim, Edward Wright, had purchased only $60 
worth of crack cocaine, and had made only a single sale for 
about $40 to $50 at the time of the robbery.  While Wright 
did indeed possess only a small amount of cocaine and cash, 
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we have found the de minimis standard satisfied in similarly 
low-stakes robberies.  See Haywood, 363 F.3d at 202, 211 n.7 
(holding that ―interstate commerce was affected, however 
minimally‖ by the robbery of $50 to $70 in cash from a bar).   
Second, the Walkers argue that the evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate that Wright‘s cocaine originated 
from outside of Pennsylvania.  As discussed in the prior 
section, the government presented reliable expert testimony 
from Chief Goshert that the cocaine sold in Harrisburg is 
manufactured outside of Pennsylvania and transported into 
the state.  This case is therefore distinguishable from cases 
involving marijuana in which the government‘s evidence that 
the marijuana was grown out of state was more equivocal.  
See United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 853–54 (7th Cir. 
2001) (noting DEA agent‘s testimony that brick marijuana 
did not ―normally‖ originate in Indiana, but that it was 
―possible‖ but ―highly unlikely‖ the marijuana was grown in 
Indiana).  Accordingly, a rational juror could conclude from 
Goshert‘s testimony that Wright‘s cocaine was not produced 
in Pennsylvania.   
Third, the Walkers argue that their convictions should 
be overturned because they robbed a ―private citizen‖ rather 
than a business.  In making this argument, the Walkers cite to 
the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Wang, 222 
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).  Wang is one of several decisions by 
our sister circuits holding that the government may not 
demonstrate that the robbery of a private individual‘s 
personal property affected interstate commerce based solely 
on evidence that the victim was employed by a company 
operating in interstate commerce.  See id. at 239 (―[A] small 
sum stolen from a private individual does not, through 
aggregation, affect interstate commerce merely because the 
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individual happens to be an employee of a national company . 
. . .‖); United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 
2002) (―[T]he government must show something more than 
the victim‘s employment at a company engaged in interstate 
commerce to support Hobbs Act jurisdiction.‖); United States 
v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1994) (overturning 
Hobbs Act conviction where the robbery victim ―was an 
individual whose only connection with interstate commerce 
was his employment by a business engaged in interstate 
commerce‖).   
Even if these decisions are correct—a question not 
before us today—they are unhelpful to the Walkers.  The 
central rationale of decisions such as Wang is that courts 
should not ―apply the aggregation principle in conjunction 
with long chains of causal inference that would have been 
necessary to arrive at a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.‖  Wang, 222 F.3d at 239; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 567 (―To uphold the Government‘s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States.‖).  In other words, these decisions held 
that the mere facts that (1) an individual was robbed of 
personal property, (2) the individual happens to work for a 
company engaged in interstate commerce, and (3) there was 
some incidental effect on that person‘s job performance are 
insufficient, standing alone, to establish Hobbs Act 
jurisdiction, because the connection between the robbery and 
interstate commerce is too attenuated.   
The connection between the robbery in this case and 
interstate commerce is much more direct.  At the time of the 
robbery, Wright was selling illegal drugs.  As we recognized 
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in United States v. Orozco, ―[a] large interstate market exists 
for illegal drugs.  Congress has the power to regulate that 
market just as it has the power to regulate food and drugs in 
general.‖  98 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1996).  In the wake of the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Raich, which held that 
Congress‘ authority under the Commerce Clause includes 
―the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of 
marijuana,‖ 545 U.S. at 5, an argument can be made that any 
robbery of illegal drugs—even drugs grown and sold entirely 
within a single state—interferes with the national market for 
illegal drugs and therefore has a sufficient connection to 
interstate commerce to create jurisdiction under the Hobbs 
Act.  See Needham, 604 F.3d at 688 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that, in light of Raich, the ―term ‗commerce‘ in the 
Hobbs Act—whose ‗reach‘ is ‗coextensive‘ with the 
Commerce Clause—includes purely ‗homegrown‘ marijuana‖ 
(citation omitted)).  On this view, merely by attempting to rob 
an individual drug dealer, the Walkers were directly seeking 
to ―obstruct[] . . . the movement of [a] . . . commodity in 
commerce.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
In this case, there is no need to embrace such a broad 
proposition, because there is also evidence that the cocaine 
Wright possessed originated outside of Pennsylvania.  As 
several of our sister circuits have concluded, the government 
may satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act 
by proving that a robbery targeted a drug dealer whose wares 
originated out of state.  As Judge Posner explained for the 
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Thomas, a robbery which 
interferes with the sale of drugs ―obstruct[s] commerce in a 
pretty literal sense.‖  159 F.3d 296, 297 (7th Cir. 1998).  The 
cocaine in Thomas ―originated in South America, and would 
thus have traveled in commerce.‖  Id.  By robbing the 
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prospective buyer of $675 that would have been used to 
purchase cocaine, the defendant in Thomas ―thwarted what 
would have been a sale in commerce within the meaning of 
the Hobbs Act.‖  Id. at 297–98.  The fact that: 
the amount of cocaine in contemplation [in 
Thomas] was small is irrelevant. . . . [T]he 
relevant issue is the effect on commerce of the 
entire class of transactions to which the 
transaction or transactions at issue in the 
particular case belong . . . . Any other rule 
would leave the federal government helpless to 
deal with criminal acts that have an individually 
trivial but cumulatively significant effect on the 
movement of goods and services across state 
and international boundaries. 
Id. at 298; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (―When Congress 
decides that the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to 
a national market, it may regulate the entire class.‖ (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
Employing similar reasoning, several other courts of 
appeals have found that stealing drugs that were produced out 
of state from a drug trafficker satisfies the interstate 
commerce element of the Hobbs Act.  See United States v. 
McCraney, 612 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2010) (―The 
evidence here showed that the cocaine stolen from Jones 
necessarily originated in South America, and that Jones 
intended to sell it in Iowa.  The taking of that cocaine by 
Williams thus disrupted the movement of a commodity in 
interstate commerce.‖); United States v. DeCologero, 530 
F.3d 36, 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (observing that ―[t]he robbing of a 
drug dealer typically has the required nexus with interstate 
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commerce‖ and finding evidence sufficient where robbery of 
drug dealer netted $18,000 and government expert testified 
that cocaine originates in South America); Parkes, 497 F.3d 
at 231 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support a 
Hobbs Act conviction for attempted robbery of a large bag of 
marijuana, fifty-eight smaller ―nickel bags‖ of marijuana, and 
$4,000 cash from ―a local, part-time marijuana dealer‖ in 
New York, where testimony showed that marijuana ―is almost 
exclusively trucked into the United States, predominantly 
through Mexico,‖ and that ―[v]ery little marijuana is grown in 
New York‖ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(―The prosecution offered evidence that the cocaine and 
marijuana Hansle Andrews sold originated in Latin America, 
and thus had to get to Michigan through interstate commerce. 
. . . In this case, the robbery and murder [of Andrews] 
obviously reduced the amount of drugs Andrews could buy 
and sell in interstate commerce.‖); United States v. Williams, 
342 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (―Drug dealing . . . is an 
inherently economic enterprise that affects interstate 
commerce.  For this reason, the robbery of a drug dealer has 
been found to be the kind of act which satisfies the ‗affecting 
commerce‘ element of the Hobbs Act, inasmuch as such a 
robbery depletes the business assets of the drug dealer.‖ 
(citation omitted)).      
These decisions by our sister circuits reinforce our 
view that the robbery of a drug dealer whose product 
originates outside Pennsylvania has a direct nexus to 
interstate commerce.  Accordingly, we reject the Walkers‘ 
invitation to treat this drug dealer robbery case like the kinds 
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of home invasion robberies at issue in cases such as Wang.
16
   
 Fourth, we reject the Walkers‘ argument that the 
Hobbs Act does not apply to their conduct because they 
robbed a first-time drug dealer.  ―Congress‘s power to 
criminalize . . . conduct pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
turns on the economic nature of the class of conduct defined 
in the statute rather than the economic facts . . . of a single 
case.‖ United States v. Morales-de Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 
(observing that Congress is not required ―to legislate with 
scientific exactitude‖).  The Walkers attempted to rob a drug 
trafficker.  As explained above, such robberies, in the 
aggregate, have a substantial effect on the interstate market 
for illegal narcotics.  The fact that the Walkers happened to 
rob a neophyte drug dealer is irrelevant to whether their 
conduct fits within the ―class of activities‖ prohibited by the 
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 Indeed, Wang itself recognized that the government can 
demonstrate a nexus between the robbery of personal 
property and interstate commerce by showing ―that the 
defendant knew of or was motivated by the individual 
victim‘s connection to interstate commerce.‖  222 F.3d at 
240; see also United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1088–89 
(11th Cir. 2001) (―What sets this case apart is the fact that the 
role of the Martins with regard to their business, which was 
directly engaged in interstate commerce, was not 
coincidental.  Rather, the Court is convinced by the evidence 
presented at trial that appellants targeted the Martins because 
of their interest in Rosa Medical Center.‖).  In this case, the 
Walkers were motivated by Wright‘s connection to interstate 
commerce—that is, they sought to rob him because he was a 
drug dealer. 
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Hobbs Act.
17
  Moreover, as noted above, the effect of the 
defendants‘ conduct upon interstate commerce is only 
required to be ―slight, subtle or even potential.‖  Haywood, 
363 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is 
no evidence in the record suggesting that the Walkers targeted 
Wright because it was his first day on the job.  Rather, the 
Walkers intended to rob a drug dealer, and it appears to have 
been pure happenstance that the target they selected was a 
first-time participant in drug trafficking.  Thus, the Walkers‘ 
conduct had the ―potential‖ to interfere with the sales of more 
established drug dealers.   
 Finally, we reject the Walkers‘ argument that the 
evidence supporting their convictions was insufficient 
because the government did not use the so-called ―depletion 
of assets‖ theory.  We have certainly held that this theory—
under which ―proof that a Hobbs Act violation depletes the 
assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce 
conclusively establishes the effect on commerce 
requirement,‖ Urban, 404 F.3d at 762—may be used in 
Hobbs Act cases in the wake of Lopez and its progeny.  See 
id. at 766 & n.3 (affirming continued viability of depletion of 
assets theory).  However, we decline to hold that the 
depletion of assets theory is the exclusive means by which the 
Hobbs Act‘s interstate commerce element may be satisfied.  
Such a holding would be contrary to the ―broad language‖ of 
the Hobbs Act, Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215, which does ―not lend 
                                              
17
 Even if we consider the relevant class of activities in this 
case to be robberies of new drug dealers, such robberies are 
still ―economic‖ activities under Lopez, and are likely, in the 
aggregate, to have a substantial effect on the market for 
illegal drugs.   
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[itself] to restrictive interpretation,‖ United States v. Culbert, 
435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 
(making it a federal crime to ―in any way or degree . . . 
affect[] commerce . . . by robbery or extortion‖).  Thus, while 
the government can and often will rely upon the depletion of 
assets theory, it is only required to present evidence proving 
that the ―defendants‘ conduct produces any interference with 
or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or 
even potential.‖  Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10.  As explained 
above, the government presented sufficient evidence to 
satisfy that standard in this case.  
 In summary, we hold that by presenting evidence that 
(1) the Walkers attempted to rob a cocaine dealer of a de 
minimis amount of drugs and cash, and (2) the drug dealer‘s 
cocaine originated outside of Pennsylvania, the government 
presented sufficient evidence from which a rational juror 
could conclude that the Walkers‘ conduct satisfied the 
interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act.   
 Of course, to hold that the Hobbs Act sweeps so 
broadly is not to encourage its use in every case to which it 
might apply.  Indeed, there are cases, such as this one, in 
which its use to prosecute what could be considered a fairly 
garden-variety robbery gives us some pause.  See United 
States v. Rutherford, 236 F. App‘x 835, 844–45 (3d Cir. 
2007) (non-precedential) (Ambro, J., concurring, joined by 
McKee, J.).  Our concern is amplified by the fact that the 
Hobbs Act can serve, as it did in this case, as a predicate 
offense for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the first 
violation of which carries a mandatory five-year consecutive 
prison term, and the second violation of which carries an 
extremely harsh mandatory twenty-five year consecutive 
prison term.  In this era of globalization where the apple at 
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one‘s local supermarket may come from Chile or New 
Zealand, it is increasingly difficult for robberies not to fall 
within the scope of the Hobbs Act, whose reach is co-
extensive with the broad scope of Congress‘s commerce 
power, and it is perhaps similarly uncommon for modern 
robberies not to involve firearms.  There is no doubt that 
robbery is a crime worth deterring through federal and state 
prosecution of those who engage in such acts.  We trust and 
expect that federal prosecutors will exercise their broad 
prosecutorial discretion (with which we are loath to interfere, 
see United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 216 (3d Cir. 
1998)) to make the most effective use of federal resources, to 
avoid supplanting the state criminal systems that quite ably 
address classic state-law crimes, and to seek just and 
appropriate criminal sentences in the course of their 
representation of the United States. 
VI.  Brady Motion 
Defendants next argue that the prosecution withheld 
exculpatory evidence material to their defense in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Specifically, they 
argue that the failure of the prosecution to disclose 
information regarding a March 8, 2007, incident involving 
Skylar Rhoades until after the trial prejudiced their defense 
and requires retrial.  On that day, Rhoades was asked to make 
a controlled buy of at least one ounce of crack cocaine.  
Before the operation began, Rhoades was found in the 
possession of a coat in the trunk of his car, and in the pocket 
of that coat was a small amount of suspected crack cocaine.  
The sample was sent to a lab, where it was determined that 
the total weight of the ―off-white chunky material‖ found in 
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the coat was 0.18 grams (about 1/150th of an ounce
18
), and it 
contained cocaine base.  The government did not disclose this 
to defendants until September 2008, after the conclusion of 
defendants‘ jury trial.   
In Brady and its progeny, the Supreme Court has held 
that where the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to 
the defendant that is material either to guilt or punishment, 
due process is violated.  373 U.S. at 87.  This includes both 
directly exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence.  
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).  ―[T]o establish a 
Brady violation requiring relief, a defendant must show that 
(1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or 
inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable, either because 
it was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and (3) the 
withheld evidence was material.‖  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 
F.3d 210, 252 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 
U.S. 668 (2004)).  Here, the government concedes the first 
two elements, but argues that the third element, materiality, is 
not satisfied. 
―Information is material ‗only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.‘‖  Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).  However, this 
―does not require demonstration by a preponderance that 
disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted 
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 By way of comparison, 0.18 grams is only about 1/20 of 
the weight of an ―eightball‖ (a quantity referred to numerous 
times during the trial), which is 3.5 grams. 
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ultimately in the defendant‘s acquittal . . . .‖  Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  The ―touchstone of materiality is a 
‗reasonable probability‘ of a different result.‖  Id. (quoting 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).  ―The question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence 
he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence.  A ‗reasonable probability‘ of a 
different result is accordingly shown when the government‘s 
evidentiary suppression ‗undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.‘‖  Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 
Here, defendants argue three theories of impeachment 
in support of the materiality of the withheld material: (1) 
Rhoades was preparing to frame someone through an 
undercover buy by producing the 0.18 gram rock containing 
cocaine base to the authorities after the buy and claiming he 
purchased it; (2) a decision was made not to prosecute 
Rhoades for possession of the 0.18 gram rock containing 
cocaine base as additional consideration in exchange for his 
cooperation; and (3) Rhoades was dealing and/or using drugs 
while acting as a government informant, contrary to his trial 
testimony.  According to defendants, these theories 
demonstrate a ―reasonable probability‖ sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the verdict because Rhoades ―was 
the only witness producing any direct evidence against 
[defendants] on Count III of the Indictment charging 
possession of a firearm to further the distribution of crack 
cocaine.‖19  The District Court, in a post-trial memorandum, 
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 Contrary to defendants‘ assertions, Rhoades was not the 
only witness to testify to defendants‘ possession of a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug offense.  As discussed above, Jason 
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denied defendants‘ joint motion for a new trial based on the 
aforementioned theories of a Brady violation.  Reviewing the 
District Court‘s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of 
fact for clear error, Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 254, we address each 
theory in turn and ultimately reject the Brady claim. 
A. Framing others 
Defendants‘ contention that Rhoades was preparing to 
frame someone is casually mentioned in their appellate briefs.  
We note first that no factual support or legal argument is 
offered to substantiate the claims beyond the level of fanciful 
speculation.  Such an attenuated and unsupported assertion 
does not cast doubt on the outcome of the trial and thereby 
constitute a Brady violation.  See United States v. Starusko, 
729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (―[Brady non-disclosure] 
must adversely affect the court‘s ability to reach a just 
conclusion . . . .‖).   
Second, even were this court to accept defendants‘ 
conjecture, it would not rise to the level of a ―reasonable 
probability‖ sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.  
The possession of what can only be considered a minimal 
amount of crack cocaine (about 1/150th of an ounce), when 
Rhoades was asked to make a controlled buy of an amount 
more than one hundred times greater than that (one ounce or 
more), cannot reasonably be tied to an elaborate scheme to 
                                                                                                     
McNeil testified that the defendants possessed a firearm in 
furtherance of their drug distribution.  Moreover, in Barron‘s 
reply brief, he changes his theory and instead argues that 
Rhoades was not the ―only witness,‖ but instead ―was a 
critical witness.‖ 
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frame someone else.  Although not impossible, it is certainly 
not reasonably probable, and thus, cannot be the basis for 
Brady relief. 
B. Non-prosecution 
Defendants‘ second contention is that the March 2007 
incident was material because it was ―part of the 
consideration provided in exchange for [Rhoades‘s] 
cooperation‖ which resulted in non-prosecution ―for yet an 
additional crack cocaine violation.‖  This in turn would help 
to impeach Rhoades, defendants argue, because he would 
have a motive to lie to please the prosecution. 
While we have recognized that ―undisclosed Brady 
material that would have provided a different avenue of 
impeachment is material, even where the witness is otherwise 
impeached,‖ Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d at 134 (emphasis 
added), ―‗impeachment evidence, if cumulative of similar 
impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous and 
therefore has little, if any, probative value,‘‖ id. at 133 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Conley v. United States, 415 
F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
Here, Rhoades was already impeached by defendants 
with respect to his self-interested motivation in agreeing to 
testify against defendants.  As defense counsel noted at trial, 
in exchange for Rhoades‘s cooperation, the government 
dismissed two charges pending against him—possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine and use of a firearm in furtherance 
of drug trafficking.  The government also gave him a very 
substantial reduction in his term of imprisonment (from 
approximately 9–10 years to 63 months) on an additional 
charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The value 
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of additional impeachment by reference to possession of 0.18 
grams of crack cocaine in March 2007 is of ―little, if any, 
probative value‖ because it is impeachment by the same 
avenue already taken by the defendants, namely Rhoades‘s 
motivation for testifying against the Walkers as part of a 
bargained-for reduction in criminal penalties.  Defendants had 
already thoroughly attacked Rhoades‘s credibility on account 
of prosecutorial inducements used to secure Rhoades‘s 
testimony against defendants, and thus this avenue of 
impeachment does not provide a ―reasonable probability‖ of a 
different outcome.  See Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 
251 (2d Cir. 1998) (―When a witness‘s credibility has already 
been substantially called into question in the same respects by 
other evidence, additional impeachment evidence will 
generally be immaterial and will not provide the basis for a 
Brady claim.‖ (emphasis added)).   
C. Continued drug use and sale 
Defendants‘ final contention concerns whether 
Rhoades continued to use and sell drugs.  They point to the 
following exchanges during the cross-examination of 
Rhoades: 
Q: Let me turn your attention to robbery 
charges.  Am I correct in saying that you 
and John McNeil had participated in 
robbery charges together? 
A: In robbery charges together?  I ain‘t 
never been in no robbery charges with 
him. 
Q: Never? 
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A: Never. 
Q: And if anybody testified to that, they‘re 
being untruthful and you are being 
truthful in your denial? 
A: Yes, I am. 
. . . . 
Q: While you were an informant, did you 
deal drugs or sell drugs with Mr. 
McNeil? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you deal drugs or sell drugs with 
anybody during that period of time? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay.  So you stopped dealing drugs 
when?  When you were arrested on those 
charges in 2006? 
A: Yes. 
. . . . 
Q: So you became legitimate after you were 
arrested? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay.  Now, you‘ve testified that you 
brought a lot of cocaine back from New 
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York, correct, Harlem, Queens, South 
Queens?  Is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When did you bring all this cocaine and 
make it into crack and sell it in 
Harrisburg? 
A: Before the time I got caught and indicted 
for this. 
Q: Before you got into trouble? 
A: From 15 until then. 
Q: And now you‘re a different person? 
A: Yes. 
A fair reading of Rhoades‘s testimony is that he stated (i) he 
did not engage in any robberies with John McNeil, (ii) anyone 
who said he engaged in such robberies was lying, (iii) he 
never sold drugs with John McNeil, and (iv) he did not sell 
drugs after 2006.  Defendants argue that Rhoades ―presented 
himself to the Court and jury as not having anything to do 
with drugs after his arrest in 2006, and as someone who was 
working as a government informant who had been totally 
rehabilitated and specifically testified that all those that said 
differently [by identifying him as a participant in robberies] 
were untruthful and not worthy of belief.‖  Therefore, 
defendants argue, had the jury known of Rhoades‘s March 
2007 possession of 0.18 grams of crack cocaine, they would 
not have believed ―that he was telling the truth about his 
rehabilitation,‖ id., and thus, would not believe any of his 
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testimony regarding Counts I, II, and III. 
The contradiction between Rhoades‘s testimony and 
that of other witnesses regarding Rhoades‘s participation in 
robberies was already highlighted to the jury through cross-
examination and argument, and the March 2007 incident does 
not reflect on that contradiction.  Moreover, although 
Rhoades denied selling drugs after 2006, nowhere in his 
testimony does he expressly deny possessing or using drugs 
after that date.  The inference starting from a single instance 
of possession of 0.18 grams of crack cocaine and 
extrapolating to selling or dealing drugs is not so strong as to 
provide a reasonable probability that the jury would find 
Rhoades wholly unbelievable, as defendants argue.  Thus, 
disclosure of Rhoades‘s March 2007 possession of 0.18 
grams of crack cocaine was not likely to ―undermine[] 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.‖  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
678. 
We clarify that, although the March 2007 incident is 
potentially a new avenue of impeachment, it is not material 
for Brady purposes.  As noted above, we have recognized that 
―undisclosed Brady material that would have provided a 
different avenue of impeachment is material, even where the 
witness is otherwise impeached.‖  Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d 
at 134.  In making this observation, we cited to two of our 
prior cases, Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d Cir. 
2004), and United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969, 972 
(3d Cir. 1991), in which different avenues of impeachment 
were indeed material.  However, this is not to say that every 
unexplored avenue of impeachment is ipso facto material; 
because the ―touchstone of materiality is a ‗reasonable 
probability‘ of a different result,‖ Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 
(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682), it is only those new 
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avenues of impeachment that sufficiently undermine 
confidence in the verdict that will make out a successful 
Brady claim.  Indeed, our primary concern in Lambert v. 
Beard was that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had 
concluded that a witness ―was so thoroughly impeached that, 
ipso facto, additional evidence could not have made a 
difference,‖ and we held that it was ―patently unreasonable to 
presume—without explanation—that whenever a witness is 
impeached in one manner, any other impeachment becomes 
immaterial.‖  633 F.3d at 133–34.  Our statement in Lambert 
v. Beard is a recognition that there are some instances where 
specific impeachment evidence is so important (for issues 
such as the identity of the culprit) that it is material for Brady 
purposes even when a witness has already been effectively 
impeached on other issues.  See id. at 135–36 (witness‘s prior 
reference to another “co-defendant” other than the accused 
was material even though witness had been thoroughly 
impeached on other grounds because witness had testified at 
trial that only the accused and one other person were present); 
Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 387–88 (impeachment evidence was 
material where the witness had previously identified another 
individual as the culprit even though the witness had been 
impeached by prior statements in which she failed to identify 
defendant as the culprit); Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 972 (noting 
that whether ―the jury has had an opportunity to consider 
other impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for 
determining materiality,‖ but instead was whether the 
evidence, ―if disclosed and used effectively . . . may make the 
difference between conviction and acquittal‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676)). 
We further observe that this was not a case in which 
there was a lone witness providing uncorroborated testimony.  
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Cf. Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d at 134 n.3 (―‗[C]onfidence in 
the outcome is particularly doubtful when the withheld 
evidence impeaches a witness whose testimony is 
uncorroborated and essential to the conviction.‘‖ (quoting 
Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003))).  Here, 
Rhoades‘s testimony was not the only testimony providing 
direct support to the prosecution on Counts I, II, and III—
Jason McNeil independently testified at length to the 
defendants‘ conspiracy to sell drugs, actual sale of drugs, and 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of those drug sales, 
corroborating Rhoades‘s testimony.  While it is regrettable 
that the government did not disclose the March 8, 2007, 
incident prior to trial, the government‘s mistake does not rise 
to the level of a Brady violation. 
VII.   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court‘s 
judgments of conviction and sentence will be affirmed in all 
respects. 
